Military Report of Fort Attaway
Rome, GA.
Fieldworks: “Their object is to provide a body of troops, or a town, with a secure protection against a sudden assault of superior numbers by the interposition of a parapet or some material capable of resisting the effects of projectiles.”1
Evaluator: LTC (RET) David Chuber
US Army
Infantry
Credentials: 22 years Infantry Officer
US Army Historian
BA American History, MS Military History, MS in Adult Education
Thesis: Field Fortifications in the Civil War US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS.
Process: I did an extensive terrain walk and map review / recon. This includes aerial maps and historical. I also review historical photos of the fort. I reviewed the primary sources, official battle reports and the physical evidence. I did not look at any of the internet sites pertaining to Fort Attaway or review other historians works. This was done deliberately to keep my investigation as objective as possible so the report would have clarity and a military focus.
Findings: Fort Attaway is a defensive complex that is located on what is locally known as De Soto Hill and the adjacent hills of the same ridgeline. The fortification is a complex of infantry entrenchments and gun positions that were dug (man made) or used the natural rock outcroppings to build parapets for the fortification. These types of fortifications are comparable on a smaller scale to examples found at Kennesaw Mountain battlefield. The infantry trenches begin near the Oostanaula River one mile north of the City of Rome. These ridges run from the Oostanaula River west-southwest to Highway 27 to the railroad over pass. The ridge runs west to what is called 2nd Avenue and then to Shorter Avenue (Alabama Road) and on to Shorter Hill. Although not all of the ridgelines were completely defended by Confederate troops, due to the lack of troops available they all did or do show evidence of American Civil War Field Fortifications. The Confederates had planned to defend the city in depth and use the principle of interior lines in defending the city against a larger force through the intersection fires of three forts: Attaway Complex, Fort Jackson and Fort Stoval. The once Southern Rail Road Line has already destroyed the lower portions of Fort Attaway and part of the original battlefield. I could not find any evidence of a ditch, palisades or forward defensives. These may have also been destroyed by the urban sprawl and the railroad. Much of the battlefield, obstacles and most of the forward advance positions have been covered by the urban encroachment except in the Oak Hill Church of Christ area. Here the physical evidence is strongest as part of the battlefield on the Union side. The largest concentration of evidence on the Confederates side was at base of the Sumos Japanese Steak restaurant. He we find clear evidence of heavy small arms firing. Any further widening of the rail bed or the road toward the south of its present location would destroy the forts base, and the historical record.
Evidence Presented: Official Records of the War of the Rebellion provides the first step in the fort’s location and the troop movements in and around Rome Ga. Artillery Range Fans proved the correct distant due to the max and effective ranges of the artillery guns in General Jeff Davis artillery units, and the over welling physical evidence, that seems to be over looked, gives a true picture of the battle, troops involved and the Fort Attaway’s location in the three field forts protection area of Rome, Ga. This evidence supports what General Jefferson Davis saw as the “Strongest Fortified Place that I have seen in Dixie”.2
Surviving Maps: Drawings and so-called maps of the time do not show the true military location of all the forts in and around the Rome area. These maps are inconsistent and do not show the entrenchments or the batteries position in all areas. Maps do not depict all the key terrain, with height and elevation as it applies to military termology. Maps do not support the engineer doctrine in the keeping of field fortifications at the time of the American Civil War. The so called maps / drawings of The Georgia Militia, Watterman, Merrill, and the Ruger Map all have flaws and are inaccurate. To find the true terrain layout one must rely heavily on primary sources, the physical evidences and the technology for the weapon systems of the armies.
The 1864 Merrill drawing is wrong. If this map is overlay on to a current topographic map, and it is to scale, a good researcher will found it to be incorrectly drawn. The ridgeline that runs from the railroad bridge over to the Summerville Road is shown running from north to south. In review of a modern topographic map we find this is part of the Fort Attaway Complex and it runs east to west. Merrill’s drawing is difficult to understand and it is not possible to determine scale or height of some of the areas. He does correctly guess the campsites north of Shorter Hill and behind what is locally known as De Soto Hill or Fort Attaway. Current ground evidence supports this. (See map #1 & Artifacts).
The 1863, Georgia Militia Map is a poor drawing that may have been ok for local militia to find their way but it is a poor substitute for a detail map. It is not helpful because the field forts were incomplete until February 1864 and would not show up as completed works on this map. What does show, are the possible entrenchments that would be the fall back secondary positions / works or bridge fortifications. This would be more like a fieldwork called a Priest-Capor, or Lunette, but more likely it is a Redan or several that are connected. Priest-Capor is a four-sided walled field fortification with two Salient angles facing the suspected enemy location with a possible gun emplacement in the center. It looks like a swallowtail formation in the field. Lunette is a temporary fortification consisting of two faces forming a salient angle and two parallel flanks. This work is built in the shape of a “C”. A Redan is a small two-walled field fortification that forms a salient angle facing the suspected enemy location. This work was used to cover river crossings, bridges, and entrances to a bastion. It is a supported field works to other fortified works (See diagram #1). The Georgia Militia map does not represent a field fort but is a line in the defense against the Main Avenue of attack by Union forces. Military speaking, this was the second line of defense if the Fort Attaway Complex if or when it failed to provide defensives for the bridges. The enemy ground troops would be denied the bridges and would have to face fire from the entrenchments protecting the bridges and Fort Norton and Stoval. Today this would be called a “Kill Zone”. Three intersecting fields of fire into one area, artillery and rifle musket in an open area (area between Fort Attaway and the bridges) would have a devastating effect had the Confederates draw the Federals into this area. (See Map #2)
The Watterman Map is another poor drawing. It is off center, not drawn to scale and doesn’t depict the terrain correctly or have a scale. It shows part of the west side of the Fort Attaway complex but the rest is a poor example / attempt to draw a ridgeline. On the east side of the railroad bridge, Watterman does not draw the ridge that is there today but as if he was unsure of the terrain he draws a zig zag line and writes “Rebel Works”. This is not consistent with primary sources and the physical evidence but leads one to believe that there are “Rebel Works on the east side of the Summerville Road and the Rail Road Bridge. (See Map #3)
The Ruger Map is really a Campaign Map. It shows the big scale but is not concerned with small-scale actions or defenses. It does show Rome and two of the three forts. It leaves out entrenchments that were on the other maps. Fort Attaway is a complex of entrenchments on the De Soto Hill ridgeline and did not rate being called a “Rebel Fort”. This map seems to be a computation of sources. I could not find out how this map was constructed and why things were left out when other maps of poorer quality were more detailed. Union General Davis referenced the rebel works on Desoto Hill (footnote) but Ruger did not have or use General Davis information when he made his broad-brush campaign map. (See Map #4)
The 1967 topographic map of Rome shows the most defensivable terrain in the north as a ridgeline that begins near the Oostanaula River one mile north of the City of Rome. These ridges run west-southwest to Highway 27 at the railroad over pass. The ridge runs west to what is called 2nd Avenue and to shorter Avenue and on to Shorter Hill. Note: It is my belief that the ridge line that parallels the Coosa River south of Shorter Ave and Shorter Hill were also part of the Fort Attaway Complex. This is the first line of defense in the protection of Rome. This ridgeline is Key Terrain in the defense of Rome and Fort Attaway is on these ridges. Key Terrain is the current military term that is defined in terms of victory for the side that controls the location. (See Map #5)
The ridgeline and Fort Attaway Complex runs from the Oostanaula River to Highway 27 and the railroad is 4/10 of a mile. From Highway 27 to 2nd Avenue it is 5/10 to 7 /10 of a mile depending on how you walk the area; 2nd Avenue to Shorter Avenue, 2/10 mile; Shorter Avenue to Shorter Hills, 7/10 mile. The ridge still travels southwest in an arch from the Oostanaula River to the Coosa River for almost 2 miles.
Artillery: There are two key points here that can prove the quoted distances in the Official Records are wrong. Just as we know that the time of day was not standard, few soldiers had watches. Volunteer soldiers or officers, had little knowledge of range estimation or map reading. Infantry officers gave distances in the line of march. This would be road distances. Because the roads twist and turn the distance would not be the same as for an Artilleryman who must do range estimation by line of sight. Artillery in the Civil War was done by “direct fire”. That means that the gunners must see the target to fire at it. There were no forward observers during the Civil War. No one in the field calling in targets on radios using standardize map grid coordinates. The range had to be estimation by the gunner and he had to see the target. Then the gun crew would fire the round that took a direct flight to the target.3 To put it simply, Artillery ranges are direct straight line distances while the Infantry distance take the bends and curves of the contour of the ground. The Infantry always has to take the longer route. With all these problems the soldiers found it hard to know what time it was and where they were located. It is very likely that the Union officers were given their distances to Rome in “March Route” which is why they are off in their estimates by one mile.
If we look at the artillery “Battle Ranges and Max Effective Ranges” of the guns, and the known report of the Confederate largest gun being a 32 lbs gun, we find that no gun (Union or Confederate) could fire at the Max range for more than 1922 yards.4 In a key account by General Davis in the Official Records we find the true range and distances using the guns ranges. We also find a better location of Fort Attaway if we analyze both.
“A few troops advanced into the works on DeSoto Hill were sufficient to draw the enemy’s artillery fire from the two formidable field-works, one situated on the east bank of the Oostanaula (Fort Norton) and the other on the south bank of the Coosa. (Fort Stoval. The works were situated on two high hills and completely commanded all approaches to them from the opposite side of the river, as well as the works just abandoned by the enemy (Fort Attaway Complex) and now held by us. In order to test the full strength of the enemy, I order Barnett’s (Ill) and Gardners (Wis) batteries to be put into position on DeSoto Hill and to open fire. This was done, and after half hour’s practices the superiority of our batteries was gratifyingly manifested by an almost complete silence of the enemy’s guns.”5
Analyses: We find that Confederate Batteries, at Norton and Stoval could not fire much past the Rail Road and Summerville road intersection with the guns they had on hand. First it would be hard to see over the Attaway Ridgline. Even with a 5-degree elevation they may have landed at the most, near Little Dry Creek. We also see Union guns had to be on what is locally know at Fort Attaway or its defensive work Complex i.e.: De Soto Hill, to even get the max range at 5 degrees of elevation of its guns to “silence the enemy’s guns.” In conferring with historian Mark McGhee at US Army Artillery School, the Paulson Brothers Corp. of Wisconsin and modern day gunners at the Artillery school all believe that the terrain at FT Stoval is to high from counter battery fire unless they (Union) artillery could move to a higher elevation. The only place that provides the space and the elevation would be the ridgeline of the Fort Attaway complex. It is well know that solid shot was used in counter battery fire and it has the max range. The Union gunners were firing at Confederate guns and that is the round they had to use. De Soto Hill is the highest point to support the ranges of the Union guns.
The Paulson Brothers Corp has done extensive testing with original guns. Bruce Paulson felt that the 10lbs Parrots (5th Wisconsin had 2 10lbs guns) would have the best chance to hit anything with-in a one-mile target. The guns had to have the elevation. There is no terrain that would support counter battery between the current Fort Attaway ridgeline and the Rome bridges in 1864.
Road Distances: In using a topographic map and modern odometer we find the Summerville road distance to be off from what the Union officers reported in there official records.
Distance from Farmers Bridge to Dry Creek = 4.1 mile
Distance from Dry Creek to Little Dry Creek = 1.75 mile
Distance from Little Dry Creek to Broad ST in downtown Rome = 1 mile
Total Distance is 6.85 not the 8 miles reported by Union officers.
Historical Photo: The 1911 Rock Quarry photo show Ft Attaway on the west side of the Summerville road. Some tall trees still stand on the hilltop There was no signs for a road or quarry activity on the sight at the time of this photo.
Official Report Review: The Union reports that come out of Brigadier General Jefferson C. Davis Second Division of the 14th Army Corps are easy to follow and give a clear account of the Battle for Rome, GA. They have not been glorified by the officers in their writing as so many are. They do have some typical problems, that many reports time and distance are incorrect. Range estimations were not requirement in the ranks of the officer corps both Union and Confederate. Some maps are done (correctly) in road or march distances while others are done as a straight-line map distance. Time / Time Zones had not become standardized in the United States during the time of the Civil War.
Brigadier General Kennar Garrard’s Federal Cavalry Division Commander had pushed Colonel Robert H. G. Minty’s brigade out on a recon on the 15th of May 1864. They made contact with Confederate Cavalry at Farmers Bridge on Armuchee Creek, he states 8 miles from town but today the road measurement is only 6.85 of a mile from town. Minty said they pushed the Confederates down the Summerville Road toward Rome until he met more Confederates outside of Big Dry Creek area. He felt he had found a larger force and decided to fall back to the protection of General Garland’s Cavalry Division at Floyd Springs.6
On the 16th of May Brigadier General Jefferson C. Davis was order to work with the Cavalry units in the local area 7. Then cross the Oostanaula River and move south to cut the railroad between Rome and Kingston 8. The problem for Davis was he could not cross the Oostanaula north of the city because there was no bridge or ford. The only way was to go down the Summerville road and fight his way into town and take the bridges.9
General Davis did not have cavalry troops anymore because they went back to Resaca. General Garrard left Davis without any cavalry force in his area 10 Davis did have three Infantry Brigades. 1st Brigade under General J. D. Morgan had 4 regiments of Infantry; the Second Brigade under Col. J. G. Mitchell had 6 regiments of Infantry, while the Third Brigade under Col. Daniel McCook had 5 regiments. More important to help understand the real distance from point to point is Davis artillery. He had the 5th Wisconsin Artillery and Battery I, of the 2nd Illinois Artillery. 11
The 2nd Ill, Battery I, had a mixture of guns that shot a variety of ranges before they moved out on campaign. By the time of the battle of Rome they had turn there guns in for 3 inch Rifle (Rodmans). The max range for these guns using Solid Shot was 1,830 yards at 5 degrees elevation, only if the gunner observed the target.12 Although, the max range for solid shot is the longest, the battery would always fire at the “Effect Range” which is hundred yards shorter due to the limitations of firing at “Line of Sight.” Battle Ranges for the other three types of artillery projectiles, Canister, Shell and Spherical Case would be hundred of yards shorter to ½ the max effective ranges.
The 5th Wisconsin Artillery Battery had a mixture of guns at the time of the battle of Rome. There were two 10 lbs Parrott Rifles, two 12 lbs Napoleon’s and two 12 lbs MT. Howitzers.13. The 10 lbs Parrott Rifles had the maximum range of all the batteries guns. There max range of solid shoot was 1900 yards at 5-degree elevation. MT Howitzers had the shortest ranges of the 5th Wisconsin Artillery Battery. The ranges for the other three types of artillery projectiles was; Canister = max 250 yards for 12 lbs Howitzer, and Shell and Spherical Case can be 1/2 of the max effective range using solid shot.14
General Davis followed General Garrard’s cavalry route which took him south until he meet Confederate pickets where the confederate cavalry had been two days before at Farmers Bridge.15 This Confederate force also fell back 16 Davis feed his troops near Farmers Bridge. After a two-hour lunch break he detached two regiments out of his 15 regiments to guard his supply trains.17
The 34th Illinois were pushed forward into
skirmish line and brushed off the Confederate cavalry. There is an account by
LT. Col Oscar Van Tassell saying he hit the enemy six miles from Rome. Note:
In a modern road test the correct mileage is really 6.85 to Rome. Capt.
Ege said he and Lieutenant Slaughter of Company F. reported “driving the rebels
within their works at Rome”18 It is hard
for one to believe that these Infantry officers were giving anything other than
their best estimate when they had never seen Rome.
They did not know how far past the “enemy works” Rome was. These officers did
not give a “road distance or a straight line distance” just their best guess
distance. If the so- called Fort Attaway was closer to the town or the bridges
these officers would have seen them and would have surely wrote about them
because they would have been receiving artillery fire from Fort Norton and
Stoval. They did not receive this fire, see the bridges or the city because
they were one mile off and had pushed the Confederates into De Soto Hill or the
Confederate works of the Fort Attaway complex.
Lt Col. Maris Vernon, 78 Illinois reported that the Confederate works were part of Rome’s main line of Defense. He said “On the afternoon of the 17th skirmished with enemy, driving him to his main line of fortifications before the city”19.
General Davis wrote “Mitchell’s Brigade had the advance and pushed rapidly forward, driving the enemy’s cavalry until within canon range of the enemy’s works on De Soto hill on the westside of the Oostenaula River.”20 Mitchell reported that the Confederates fired on him with artillery from the De Soto Hill fort.21 De Soto Hill is Fort Attaway. It is the only major terrain feature in the area within range of the supporting defensives, and it is the first line in the defense of Rome from the north. It is the first defendable terrain North of the city. It’s height is comparable and supportable to Fort Norton and Stoval while lending little to no support to Fort Attaway from FT. Norton and it would be more likely un-observed fire from FT. Stoval. Range and the lack of forward observers was the problem in the 19th century artillery. (Note: This would be half way between Big and Little Dry Creek. In the ground evidence section, we find one 3 inch Confederate Reed Shell in the Oak Hill Church of Christ area while numerous pieces of shell were found in and around Fort Attaway. There was also found in the area one complete US Parrot shell. See artifacts).
The Confederates on the other hand knew the correct distances. General H. B. Davidson reported to Major General G. French that on the 17th May Union soldiers had pushed from the north to within 2 ½ miles for Rome. This would correctly place General Davis men between Big Dry Creek and Little Dry Creek. The Union report of artillery fire had to come from Fort Attaway. Neither FT. Norton nor FT Stoval could see or fire effectively into the Dry Creek area due to range and line of sight.
General French at first had few soldiers to defend Rome.22 Brigadier General Matthew D. Ector’s infantry was sent to support along with North Carolina infantrymen from around the Kingston area.
Ector’s brigade at once crossed the river and a part was placed in the works and the rest thrown forward as skirmishers on the crest of the ridge in front.” Soon after Generals Ross and Morgan arrived with some cavalry. They dismounted and put on the crest of hills to strengthen skirmishers.” 23
The Union soldiers were moving down the Summerville Road from the North. The “Crest of the Ridge in Front” is the fort Attaway complex. There is no other ridge once you cross the Rome bridges along the Summerville Road that is defendable terrain. There is no other terrain feature that could be called a “Ridge” coming from Rome going north. Ector’s brigade was “placed in the works and the rest thrown forward as skirmishers”. Again the “works” is referred to as Fort Attaway Complex and the skirmishers are forwards in the Little Dry Creek area.
Ground Evidence in this location: Texas and North Carolina buttons have been found. Texas saddle stirrups, horseshoes were also found in and around the ridgelines know at DeSoto Hill and Fort Attaway. There are both marked graves of Texas and North Carolina soldiers in the cemetery known then as Fort Stoval. (See Artifacts)
The Confederate reinforcements bolster moral to the point that the Lawrence Ross Brigade of the 9th Texas Cavalry “leap the works driving the enemy’s skirmishers back and charged their main line of infantry composed of Jeff Davis Infantry Division and drove them from their position in confusion with heavy loss.” 24
Although the Confederate left their works and showed the Union soldiers that they were willing to fight by the end of the 17th May the Union superior numbers covered the northern and western roads into Rome via both the Summerville Road and the Alabama Roads. General Davis wrote “My lines as then established completely invested the enemy’s works on the west bank of the river, my left being so near the Osstenaula and my right so near to the Coosa, as to prevent my flank from being turned from either direction.” 25
General Davis had control of the flanks. In Liner Warfare the advantage shifts to the offense. Fort Attaway Complex troops are withdrawn. The Confederate's only option was to draw the Union into the area pasted Fort Attaway ridges where FT Norton and Stoval could keep them from using the roads as high-speed avenues of approach into Rome and capture the bridges. In modern day terms this Kill Sack was perfect. The Confederates controlled the high ground with forts and heavy guns. A river faced the attacker. And the terrain favored the defender. This was not to happen. General Joseph E. Johnston orders were to withdraw from the defenses of Rome. General French withdrew and the only defenders were now no more than a delaying force at Norton and Stoval.
On the morning of the 18th May the 121st Ohio found the ridges around DeSoto Hill & Fort Attaway complex empty, General Davis quickly took advantage of the works and placed his two batteries and aimed them at Fort Stovall’s guns. 26 Note: FT. Stoval was at the max range of his batteries guns. Fort Norton was attacked by Union ground troops. Forward Observers would not come into the Field Artillery training for many years after the Civil War.27 The Confederate troops were withdrawn while Fort Stoval covered that withdraw. Fort Stovall cover the withdraw by engaging in counter battery fire with the Union artillery on De Soto Hill / FT Attaway Complex. 28
Conclusion: The Official Records, local knowledge of the area, city roads, landmarks and terrain features should be enough to pin-point the battlefield and Fort Attaway Complex for anyone who has doubts but the overwhelming ground evidence should hold the truth if one looks closely. Through the artillery range fans of the different guns and the explanation of the road distance, this only substantiates the pervious evidence. Mathematical field guns could only fire at certain elevations. To adjust to different levels they had to position themselves on ground equals or to a level they could fire at their max elevation to hit a target that is on higher ground. Our example is DeSoto / Attaway ridge line height is sufficient to have them fire on the top of FT. Stoval or Jackson.
Outcome: 1. Collect ground evidence and fix GPS coordinates to the artifacts.
2. Archaeologists investigate complete ridgeline and designate a safe area from urban development or railroad expansion.
3. Interpretive markers be placed on Summerville Road near the Rail Road for Fort Attaway and another battlefield marker near Oak Hill Church of Christ on the battle that ensued in that area.
4. That a prominent position of the Fort Attaway be preserved and interpreted. Under the guidance of the State, City of Rome.
Artifacts and Ground Evidence
1. Sumos Japanese Steak House: As you enter the paved driveway and proceed up De Soto Hill / FT Attaway Complex, there is strong evidences of trenches on both sides of the military crest of the hill. On the left side the trench has been filled in when the steak house was built. The right side has very clear evidence of trenches and gun emplacements. These are the most un-touched areas of the fort. Only the lower area and the battlefield have been affected by the railroad. There are clear fields of fire even today when one stands on the crest and looks toward the Church of Christ area.
2. On the backside of the steak house there is evidence of campsites. As reported by William E. Merrill, Chief Topographer for the Union Army of the Cumberland in 1864. (See Merrill Map) I found evidence of fire rings. These in themselves would not be important if not for the discovery of melted lead for bullets in and around the rings. There are additional trenches and a possible area for a “bomb proof” or storage area that needs to be investigated. This may have been a protected area for horses due to the number of horseshoes found in the area.
3. Riverside Trenches: There is still strong evidence of field works along the ridgeline to the Oostanaula River. As with the western side of the Rail Road Bridge, the tracks have also taken the base of this fortified area. In many of the areas the railroad has thrown their used ties into the creek area while the city and citizens have dumped concrete curbing and trash that has filled the emplacements. The Quarry, located near the now abandon car dealership, next to the Summerville road, has also destroy a large portion of the trenches. There is an old wagon or narrow wheel vehicle road that still can be seen in the area. It was reported that a Confederate “A” button, for artilleryman, was found along with a powder flask in this area.
4. Mid-Town Shopping Center: Ground evidence has also been presented that supports the FT. Attaway Complex. Local metal detectors claimed that this was one of the better spots to hunt when they stared clearing the land for the shopping center. This strengthens the position that the Confederates fortified the ridges on both sides of the Summerville Road and the ridgelines to the west.
5. Additional Ground Evidence: During my ground survey, I found another area that needs further investigation. On the southern side of the intersection of Rome / Selma RR and the East – West old Southern rail line there is strong evidences of a possible Civil War redoubt or later man made containment area. Union reports mention flanking the Confederates works (Ft Attaway) and going down the Alabama RD / Shorter Ave. The railroad again threatens this west and northern sections of these works. Suggest an archaeological study be done in this area.
1. Scott, H.L. (1864) Military Dictionary, Act of Congress 1861, p.283
2. Davis, Major George W., 1897 War of the Rebellion: Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies (U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. Series I Vol. 38, Part IV, p235 (hereafter “OR”)
3. Coggins, Jack. 1962, Arms and Equipment of the Civil War. Broadfoot Publishing Company, p.62
4. Ibid.
5. OR, Series I, Vol. 38 Part 1, p. 629
6. Or, Series I, Vol 38 Part I, p. 627
7. Ibid
8. Ibid
9. Ibid, p.628
10. Ibid
11. Ibid, pp.625-26
12. Brown, Murphy, Putney (1865) Behind The Guns, The History of Battery I, 2nd Regiment, Illinois Light Artillery
13. Estabrook, C.E. (1914) Records and Sketches of Military Organizations, from http://museum.dva.state.ui/his_regiments.asp
14. Scott., 66-67
15. OR, Series I, Vol.38, Part I, p.657
16. Ibid., 691
17. Ibid., p. 628-723-724
18. Ibid., p. 684
19. Ibid., pp. 687-88 Key Point: Confederates retire to “main line of fortifications”
20. OR, Series I, VOL. 38, Part IV, p.236
21. Ibid., pp.679
22. OR, Series I, VOL 38 Part III, p. 899
23. Ibid., pp.899-pp.963
24. Kerr, Homer L., ed., 1976 Fighting with Ross Texas Cavalry Brigade CSA. The Diary of George L. Griscom. Adjutant, 9th Texas Cavalry Regiment. (Hill Junior College Press, Hillsboro, TX p. 187
25. OR. Series I. Vol. 38, Part I, p. 629
26. Ibid., Series I, Vol. 28, IV, p. 236
27. Aten, Henry J., (1901) History of the Eighty-Fifth Regiment, Illinois Volunteer Infantry p. 172.
28. OR, Series I, Vol. 38, Part I, p.629
